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Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study 
I. Introduction 
Ultimatum bargaining is a building block for more complicated, and more descriptive. 
types of bargaining. 1 Given its importance in models of strategic behavior. it has been studied 
extensively through experimental methods. This research has found that proposers make larger 
offers than game-theoretic analysis would predict. Responders also reject small but positive 
offers·, again contrary to the predictions of game theory _1 The most popular explanation for these 
outcomes is that subjects care about fairness: in addition to valuing their absolute payoffs 
(money earned from the game). subjects care about their payoffs relative to those of their 
bargaining partner (fairness of the division).; 
There have been a number of suggestions as to how preferences about fairness are 
exhibited in bargaining games. This study was designed to differentiate between and to test these 
models of fairness preferences! The results of this study are consistent with the notion that 
subjects care about both money and fairness. However the framing of the game being played 
affects its outcome-offers made in percentage terms rather than in dollar amounts induce higher 
demands. and thus "fairer" outcomes. An explanation for this effect from the contingent 
weighting literature is offered which suggests placing more ·•weight" or value on the fairness part 
of one's preferences when offers are made in percentage terms and relative payoffs are 
particularly salient. 
The experiment consists of four treatments in which subjects divide a $10 pie in an 
ultimatum game. The treatments are depicted in Table 1 below and are designated by a rwo-
character code. The first character represents the form in which offers are made (dollar amounts 
[S] or percentages[%]) and the second represents the state of the responder's knowledge 
(Informed about the size of the pie [I] or Uninformed (U]). 
Insert Table 1 here 
First is the classical uitimaturn game (Sl) in which the size of the pie to be divided is conunon 
knowledge and offers are made in dollars. In the $U treatment, only the proposer knows the size 
of the pie; the responder is given no information about its size. although she knows the dollar 
offer she faces. In the %U treatment. the responder is offered only a percentage of the pie-not 
the corresponding dollar amount- and again, she does not know the total pie's size. The final 
treatment (%1) completes the 2x2 design; with both players informed about the size of the pie, 
the offer is made in percentage terms. The information conditions between treatments one and 
four are identical; only the form of the offer (the frame of the problem) differs. 
The subgame-perfect e1uilibrium (offer e, accept) is the same in all four experimental 
treatments. However. two empirical differences emerge across the treatments. First, in the 
treatments in which offers are made in dollars. uninformed responders face and accept 
substantially lower offers than their informed counterparts: the average offer in treatment SU is 
significantly lower than the average offer in SI. Second. treatments $1 and %1 in which the 
siruations are identical except for the description of the offer. evoke different responder behavior: 
average demands made by responders in treatment %1 are significantly higher than those made in 
any other treatment. including treatment Sl. This result is consistent with individuals placing 
greater value on fairness when relative payoffs are particularly salient. 
Section II describes the experimental procedure and design. Section III outlines the 
theoretical predictions of the experiments and section IV describes the results. Section V 
presents some analysis and section VI contains an informal discussion of one possible 
explanation for the observations. Section VII describes other related experiments and their 
outcomes and section VIII concludes. 
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II. Experimental Procedure and Design; 
Subjects were recruited from a variety of large undergraduate lecture classes at Harvard 
University Summer Session. 1992 and Fall. 1992 courses. Each treatment of the experiment was 
run in two sessions by the same experimenter. The sessions for each treatment were scheduled 
within one day of each other. Evidence that economics students play ultimatum games 
differently from all other students is mixed (Carter and Irons (1991), Kagel, Kim and Moser 
( 1992)); to sidestep such a debate. no economics classes were used for recruiting. Subjects were 
told that they could stay after class. complete a questionnaire and panicipate in a decision 
problem (both of which together would take 30 to 45 minutes) to earn a guaranteed $5, possibly 
more.6 Subjects who remai ned were seated along the outside aisles of the classroom and asked 
to complete a decision-making questionnaire (unrelated to the ultimatum game) for which they 
would be paid $5 at the end of the session. Ultimatum game instructions were then distributed 
according to their chosen seating. Subjects at opposite ends of the same aisle were not paired 
with one another, nor were subjects seated closely together. A composite version of the 
instructions was read aloud. with any questions answered publicly. 7 A shon quiz about the 
decisions to be made. and the payoffs which resulted from those decisions, was given and 
subjects' answers checked- and mistakes corrected-privately. All treatments involved subjects 
spl itting a $10 pie. al though not all subjects knew the size of the pie in all treatments.8 At this 
point proposers. whose instructions included an offer/acceptance sheet, made their offers in 
writing. These sheets were collected and distributed to the appropriate responders . Responders 
replied to their respective offers: these responses were shown to (but not left wi th) the 
appropri ate proposer. All subjects then completed a shon questionnaire about their perceptions 
of the game, brought their material s to the experimenters. were paid individually $5 plus their 
earnings, and left. All subjects panicipated in one and only one ultimatum decision, eliminating 
opporrunities either for reputati on effects or for learning by subjects. 
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This experiment manipulates both the amount and type of infonnation the responder has. 
Offers are made either in dollar or percentage amounts. The responder can know the size of the 
pie to be divided or not. In treatments SI and %I the responder has complete infonnation; she 
knows both the absolute amount of money and the percentage of the pie she is being offered. 
These two treatments leave the responder with logically equivalent decisions. In treatment SU 
she knows only the absolute amount of money she is being offered and not the relative payoffs 
(fairness) of the proposal. In treatment %U she knows only the percentage of the pie she is being 
offered and not the absolute (money) payoffs. 
This paper will focus on the predictions of a number of theories for comparisons between 
treatments of this experiment. Two considerations I wish to address here are preferences for fair 
outcomes on the pan of the proposers and unknown priors about the pie size on the pan of the 
responders. There is some evidence that a proponion of the population of proposers has a 
preference for fairness. and is willing to give up money in order to produce equal monetary 
outcomes (see Forsythe ec al.'s ( 1994) and Hoffman ec a/. 's (1992) dictator game data). If this is 
so. a random assignment of subjects to treatments should equalize the proponion of these "fair" 
types in the role of proposer in each of the four treatments. By focusing on comparisons 
between the various treatments. offers from these types of subjects should wash out. If anything, 
this washing out should serve to make the data from the various treatments more alike, which is 
what the subgame-perfect hypothesis predicts. Ironically then. having proposers with 
preferences for fairness will tend to support the subgame-perfect hypothesis• 
A similar random-assignment argument holds for the distribution of prior beliefs about 
the size of the pie (when it is unknown) held by responders. If the sample is rruly random, these 
priors should be distributed identically in the two uninfonned treatments, influencing outcomes 
in both treatments similarly. So by comparing differences between these two treatments. the 
differences in subjects' priors are not being measured.'0 
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Ill. Theoretical Predictions 
I examine five theories and their predictions about outcomes in this experiment. Each of 
these theories is composed of two pans. The first specifies the arguments of the responder's 
utility function. The second stipulates that proposers know these arguments. and act 
accordingly- that is. that they play best responses to the responder's demands." 
The subgame-perfect equilibrium (with pure self-interest) predicts no differences among 
these four treatments; responders should accept any positive amount or percentage.'2 Thus offers 
and responses should be identical in all four treatments Sl, $U, %U and %I. 
Bolton's (1991) comparative equilibrium relaxes the assumption that the responder will 
accept all positive offers. Bohon describes a utility function containing arguments of both 
absolute payoffs (money) and relative payoffs (an index of fairness). Players behave as 
expected-utility maximizers; in an ultimatum game, the responder would accept an offer of ~rc/2 
only if the utility from accepting the offer z were greater than or equal to the utility of rejecting 
the offer.'l Since proposers know this. they offer enough to make responders indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the offer. which critical amount, depending on the preferences in 
question, may very well be significantly more than£. This theory predicts that offers and 
demands in treatments in which the pie size is known, $I and %I, will be identical. as the form of 
the offer has no effect on its acceptance' ' 
Ochs and Roth's ( 1989) minimum-absolute threshold hypothesis suggests that the 
minimum a given responder will accept is a constant dollar amount but need not be panicularly 
small. It thus predicts that the acceptance patterns from treatments where the responder can 
calculate her absolute (money) payoff should be the same-all the responder cares about is 
getting her absolute minimum threshold; the size of the pie doesn't enter the analysis at all. Thus 
offers in three treatments $1. $U and %I should be identical. In treatment %U, the responder's 
belief about the pie size would determine whether or not she expects to receive this absolute 
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minimum threshold from" given percentage offer, eliminating the possibility of testable 
predictions without further assumptions about those beliefs . 
Ochs and Roth's ( 1989) minimum-percentage threshold hypothesis suggests that the 
minimum a given responder wtll accept is a fixed percentage of the pie. Thus the acceptance 
patterns from treatments where the responder can calculate her relative payoff should be the 
same-if the responder receives her minimum percentage she will accept, regardless of her 
beliefs about the absolute amount of money she will receive. Thus offers in three treatments$!, 
%U and %1 should be identical. In treatment $U she cannot discern the percentage of the pie she 
is being offered with certainty. she again has to rely on her beliefs about the size of the pie; the 
theory makes no testable predictions without additional assumptions.'5 
A final. descriptive hypothesis relies on the observation that in Nash bargaining games 
subjects move toward equal aivisions in situations where they know their counterpart's payoff as 
well as their own (Roth and Malouf ( 1979, 1982), Roth and Mumighan (1982)). A weak version 
of this hypothesis suggests that in treatment $U, where responders know only thei r own absolute 
(money) payoff. offers will be lower and acceptance rates higher than in treatment$!, where 
responders know both their own absolute (money) payoff and that of their proposer (and thus the 
relative (fairness) payoff) . Since prior experiments have only examined the dollar-bargaining 
cases and not the percentage-bargaining cases. this hypothesis makes no predictions in the 
percentage-offer treatments. 
A summary of the predictions from various theories follows: 
Subgame-perfect equilibrium: Acceptance and offering patterns should be identical in all four 
treatments .16 $1=$U= %U=%1 
6 
Bolton's comparative equilibrium: Acceptance and offering pauerns should be identical in 
treatments $1 and %1. Sl=%1 
Ochs and Roth's minimum-absolute threshold of acceptance: Acceptance and offering patterns 
should be identical in treatments $1. SU and %L SI=SU=%1 
Ochs and Roth's minimum-percentage threshold of acceptance: Acceptance and offering 
patterns should be identical in treatments $1, %I and %U. $l=%U=%1 
Descriptive weak version: Acceptance and offering patterns should be higher in treatment $I 
than in treatment $U. $1>$U 
IV. Results 
The offers and responses from these four treatments are shown in Figures 1-4 below. 
Each figure depicts accepted and rejected offers, as well as the mean offer. 
Insert Figures 1-4 here 
Means, standard deviations and sample sizes of offers for each treatment are summarized 
in Table 2, below. 
Insert Table 2 here 
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The average offer in the classical ulumatum game treatment (54.50) is 931! greater than 
the average offer in the uninformed version of this game {S3.57). The difference between 
average offers in the percentage-informed and -uninformed treatments is positive but not as large 
(28¢ ). Comparing average offers between dollar-offer treatments and percentage-offer 
treatments suggests no regularities ( +301! in the informed case. -35e in the uninformed case). 
Offers in treatment SI are similar to those of other SIO pie ultimatum game experiments. 
The mean offer in SI was 54.50. In Carter and Irons (1991) the mean offer for the noneconomist 
group was 54.56. Prasnikar and Roth ( 1992) repon a mean offer over ten rounds of $4.16 and 
Forsythe er a/.{1994) ha'e a mean offer of S4.67. 
The classical ultimatum game· s reJection rate is also comparable to those of other one-
shot ultimatum games. Seven percent of offers were rejected in this condition compared with a 
rejection rate of 8.3% in a similar treatment of Hoffman er a/. ( 1992)17 and a rejection rate of 
4.17% in Forsythe era/. ( 1994 ). 
V. Analysis 
A. Offers 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test compares each set of observations with each other and 
repons the probability that the underlying distributions are the same.18 Table 3 below repons the 
p-values for comparisons between each treatment. 
lnsen Table 3 here 
The main result from this analySIS is that the offers in the classical ultimatum game (SI) 
are statistically significantly greater than those in the game in which offers are made in dollars 
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and the responder is uninformed about the size of the pie ($U) (p<.OI). Weaker statistical 
support is found for other comparisons.'' 
That any of these offer distributions differ is not consistent with the subgame-perfect 
hypothesis, which predicted that offers in each treatment would be identical. The absolute-
threshold hypothesis also predicted that offers in treatments SI and SU would be identical, which 
was not the case. 
B. Responses 
The percentages of rejections are listed in Table 4 below. 
Insert Table 4 here 
One interesting result is the high frequency of rejections in the %I treatment, even though 
offers in that treatment are not significantly different than offers any of the other three 
treatments. Statistically comparing the proportion of rejections in each treatment suggests more 
rejections in treatment %I than in all other treatments. at the 5% level for %U and $U just 
missing it for $1 (p=.0154 for %U. p=.0239 SU and p=.0618 $!)."' Further evidence of high 
demands leading to high rejection rates in treatment%! is presented in the next subsection. 
C. Quesrionnaire Responses 
I. Raw Responses 
In addition to providing the data above. subjects were asked about their strategy and 
beliefs in a post-experimental questionnaire." 
In all treatments, responders were asked the provide the lowest offer they would have 
accepted (in percentage treatments. the lowest percentage offer and in dollar treatments the 
lowest dollar offer). Answers such as .. I would have accepted anything" were coded as the 
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subgame-perfect prediction of I <t or .I %. In treatments with an unknown pie size. responders 
were also asked their beliefs about the size of the pie. Means and standard deviations for the 
answers to these questions are presented in Table 5. 
Insert Table 5 here 
Figures 5-8 show the reported demands for the four treatments . 
Insert Figures 5-8 here 
2. Analvsis of Responses 
An analysis similar to that used on offers can test whether responders' demands in 
different treatments could have been generated from the same distributions. Caution should be 
used in interpreting these results. as these data are only reported. not actual, demands. 
Nonetheless, Table 6 presents the comparisons. 
Reported demands in treatment o/cl are significantly higher than those in all other 
treatments (p<.Ol). This result was not predicted by any of the discussed theories, but is 
consistent with the high levels of reJections actually observed in treatment %I. 
Insert Table 6 here 
The difference in demands is inconsistent with Ochs and Roth ' s minimum-percentage threshold 
hypothesis which predicted demands in %1 would be the same as those in %U and Sl. The 
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difference in demands between %1 and $1 suggests a framing effect. Subjects seem to care more 
about fairness when it is salient-the weight they put on the fairness aspect of their preferences 
increases when offers are made in percentage terms. 
VI. A Summary of Results, Their Implications and Some Explanations 
There are three main results emerging from this study. 
(I) Offers in SI are significantly greater than offers in $U (p<.Ol). This result is 
consistent with the descriptive hypothesis. Bolton's equilibrium and Ochs and Roth's minimum-
percentage threshold hypotheses but inconsistent with the subgame-perfect equilibrium solution 
or with Ochs and Roth's minimum-absolute threshold hypothesis. 
(2) Demands in %1 are significantly greater than those in any other treatment (p<.Ol) and 
in particular are greater than those in treatment %U. This is not consistent with Ochs and Roth's 
minimum-percentage threshold hypothesis. 
(3) Demands in %1 are significantly greater than those in any other treatment (p<.Ol). 
and in particular. are greater than demands in treatment $1. This is not consistent with 
predictions of any of the theories presented. 
One of the more intriguing explanations of result (3) involves applying models of 
contingent weighting to this strategic situation (Tversky. Sanath and Slovic (1988)). In such an 
application, the marginal tradeoffs between money and fairness would depend on the treatment 
in which the responder plays. In this setting, fairness becomes more salient in percentage 
treatments, leading one to expect that the marginal utility for fairness at each money level would 
be higher in percentage treatments than in absolute treatments. This prediction is certainly borne 
out in treatments $1 and %1. where demands are higher (more fair) in the Iauer treatment than in 
the former. However, this model must be modified to accommodate the lack of such an effect in 
the uncertain treatments (SU and 'k U) where demands are indistinguishable (p=.4564). 
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VII. Other Ultimatum Experiments and Their Outcomes 
Perhaps the most consistent finding of past ultimatum experiments is that subjects do not 
play the subgame-perfect equi librium strategy. The robust result is that proposers offer 
significantly more thane to responders and that responders sometimes reject positive offers. The 
outcomes of many ultimatum game experiments and their variations are summarized in Thaler 
(1988). Giith and Tietz ( 19901 and Roth (forthcoming).~ 
This study uses incomplete and imperfect information in an attempt to illuminate t.he 
factors involved in this behavior and to separate various theories explaining it. A similar 
approach has been used in studies of Nash bargaining. Roth and Malouf ( 1979) examined and 
accepted the hypothesis that .. when the players know both their opponents' monetary payoffs as 
well as their [opponents'] util ities. the outcome of (Nash) bargaining will be influenced by 
interpersonal comparisons. in the direction of equal gains" (p. 585). Forsythe, Kennan and 
Sopher (1991) also examined Nash bargaining with varying information. They focused on the 
incidence of strikes (no agreement-similar to rejections here) in information conditions when 
the uninformed player knew the distribution from which the pie is drawn, but not the size of the 
pie itself. As in Roth and Malouf (and unlike in Forsythe eta/.), in this study subjects are not 
given prior probability distributions about the size of the pie (the hidden information). 
Four recent experiments have examined ultimatum games with varying information 
conditions, two of which control the responders' priors and two of which involve unknown 
priors on the part of responders. 
Mitzkewitz and Nagel (I 993) compared "offer" and "demand" versions of the ultimatum 
game. In both games, the proposer was informed about the size of the pie and the responder 
knew only its probability distribution. The offer game is similar to the one used in this study 
(but run with controlled priors over the pie). however no comparison between it and an 
ultimatum game with perfect information about the pie size was presented. 
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Rapopon. Sundali and Potter ( 1992) controlled and manipulated the variability of the 
prior distribution of the pie size given to the responder. They always informed the proposer 
about the acrual size of the pie and gave the responder a distribution from which the pie size was 
drawn. The mean of this distribution was constant. although its range varied between treatments. 
As the range of this prior increased. proposers decreased their offers and responders accepted 
these smaller offers more often. 
S traub and Mumighan (forthcoming) ran a comprehensive survey/experiment asking 
subjects to respond to ranges of ultimatum offers when the pie size was known and when it was 
unknown (with no priors provided to the subjects. as in this srudy), and to make ultimatum offers 
when the pie size was known and unknown to their responders. They found a much greater 
willingness to accept very low offers (Ill) when the size of the pie was unknown than when it 
was known. Subjects adjusted their offers accordingly, offering significantly less when the size 
of the pie was private information than when it was public . However the offers subjects faced 
were pre-selected by the authors rather than endogeneously generated in the experiment. 
Finally, Kagel, Kim and Moser ( 1992) extended Roth and Malouf's Nash bargaining 
method to the ultimatum game. The proposer offered a division of 100 chips valued differently 
by each player and the responder accepted or rejected the offer. Three information condi tions 
were ru n. In the first. both players knew their own and each other's value per chip. In the 
second (third) treatment. both players knew their own chip value, but only the proposer 
(responder) knew the other player's chip value. The results from this experiment supponed the 
descriptive hypothesis; when relative (fairness) payoffs were known by the players (condition 
one), divisions tended to be more equal than when information was one-sided and only absolute 
(money) payoffs were known by the players (conditions two and three). 
These studies reinforce the result that when the size of the pie is not known by the 
responder (whether or not she is given prior beliefs about it), offers and demands fall. This paper 
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is the fi rst to examine percentage offers and demands in this context. With these treatments, 
alternative explanations for these results (involving absolute and relative payoffs) can be 
separated and tested independently. 
VIII. Conclusions 
Ultimatum bargaining is used as a building block for more complex (and realistic) kinds 
of bargaining. Past experimentation has demonstrated that preferences for fairness play a role in 
laboratory versions of these games. The experiment reponed in this paper was designed to 
detennine the imponance of th is preference for fairness under various informational and salience 
conditions. Panicularly. what role does information about absolute (money) and relative 
(fairness) payoffs play in determining offers and responses? And when relative (fairness) 
payoffs are made more salient. by having offers made in percentages. are preferences for fairness 
more influential than when offers are made in dollars? The experimental design also separated 
and to tested the predictions of five different hypotheses about fair preferences. Three main 
results were found. which were consistent with only one of the five hypotheses examined, the 
descriptive. 
First. varying the amount of information available to the responder in a classical 
ultimatum game had an effect on both the offers made and the demands. When offers were made 
in dollar form. withholding information about the size of the pie from the responder produces 
significantly smaller offers (offers in $U are lower than those in SI, p<.Ol). That there is a 
difference between offers in these two treatments (SI and $U) suggests rejecting the subgame-
perfect equi librium and Ochs and Roth· s minimum-absol ute threshold hypothesis as descriptive 
theories of how preferences for fairness exhibit themselves in ultimatum games. 
Second. there are significantly higher reponed demands in treatment %1 than in treatment 
%U (p<.OI ) and significantly higher rejection rates as well (p<.05) even though offers in the two 
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treatmems are not significantly differem. This result suggests rejecting Ochs and Roth's 
minimum-percentage thre:.hold hypothesis as a descriptive theory of how preferences for fairness 
eJthibit themselves in ulumatum games. 
Finally. significamly higher demands prevail when offers are made in percemages and 
the responder is informed C%1) than when offers are made in dollars and the responder is 
informed($!). That there is a difference between responders' stated demands in the two 
informed treatments (p<.OI) suggests rejecting Bolton's comparative equilibrium. along with the 
other three hypotheses named above. The descriptive hypothesis remains, escaping unscathed 
pnmarily because it makes no predictions about this framing effecL 
One modificauon to Bolton· s theory which would preserve its status might be found in a 
comingem weighting model. In such a model the weight responders place on absolute (money) 
payoffs as compared with relative (fairness) payoffs vary with the treatment. In panicular, when 
the pie size is known and offers are made in percentages (%1), more weight would be placed on 
relative (fairness) payoffs than when the pie size is known and offers are made in dollars (SI). 
There are ex pen mental extensions of this srudy as well. One testable implication is the 
contingent weighting eltplanation- that the frame of the game maners seems convincing, but 
how much it maners. and why it matters so clearly when responders are informed but not when 
they are uninformed about the size of the pie. needs further investigation. 
Another direction for extension in·<olves the empirical predictions of these experimental 
results. That pie divisions were more fair in the classical ultimatum game than in the uninformed 
version of it (SI versus SU) suggests that in posted-price. monopolistic industries where sellers' 
costs, and thus the pie size. are known to buyers, surplus division will be more equal than in 
industries where those costs. and thus the pie size. are unknown or uncertain (as when consumer 
goods are produced by the seller). That ultimarum bargaining over percentages with known pie 
sizes (%1) leads to panicularly high demands and high rejection rates suggests that. in cases 
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where the pie size is known. both proposers and responders should prefer to bargain over dollar 
amounts. 
This experiment was designed to distinguish among a number of theories of how subjects 
implement their preferences for fairness in bargaining games. None of the theories examined 
predicted all the results. The only one not rejected is the descriptive theory (primarily because it 
made so few predictions). A number of new experimental proposals are presented which will 
help us illuminate and explore some of the intricacies of strategic behavior. 
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Footnotes 
'In an ultimatum game. player one (the proposer) makes an offer to player 2 (the responder). 
The offer consists of a proposal dividing a sum of money (the pie or n ) between the two players. 
Usually this offer takes the fonn of "player 2 can have Sx. player I will get $(1t·X)." Player 2 can 
either accept or reject the offer made. If she accepts, the pie is divided as proposed and the game 
ends. If she rejects. neither player receives any money, and the game also ends. 
'The outcomes of many ultimatum game experiments and their variations are summarized in 
Thaler (1988), Guth and Tietz ( 1990) and Roth (forthcoming). 
3Evidence that subjects in experimental games care about fairness to some extent is provided in 
two studies of dictator games; Forsythe ec a/. (1994) and Hoffman eta/. (1992). 
'1lle experiment was not designed to demonstrate that subject in experiments care about fairness, 
but rather to investigate how those preferences emerge in various situations; i.e. to answer the 
question. under what conditions are fairness considerations more or less important in strategic 
behavior? 
s All instructions, raw data and original subject responses are available from the author. 
'This sort of a show-up fee is standard procedure in economics experiments. 
'This reading aloud served to make all infonnation about who was infonned and who was not, 
common infonnation. Instructions. including the composite version, are available from the 
author. 
srn uninfonned treatments responders were never told the actual size of the pie. although they 
could calculate it in the %U treatment by comparing the percentage of the pie they accepted with 
their earnings. 
•one reader objected strongly to this idea. claiming it is tantamount to saying that "theory X 
implies A=B=l is confinned by evidence that A=B=2 because you haveconfinned A=B!" This 
objection is exactly correct and, had offers in the four treatments been similar. such support for 
the subgame-perfect hypothesis would be suspect. However, there were significant differences 
in behavior between the four treatments. thus the experiment confinns A¢ B. 
'"'f subjects use the offers they face to update their beliefs about the size of the pie, however, and 
those offers vary between the two uninfonned treatments. then differences in those posteriors are 
being measured. 
"For simplicity I am assuming here that while responders' preferences are as assumed in each 
theory, proposers are classical expected-utility maximizers. Entirely different sets of predictions 
could be generated using other assumptions about proposers ' preferences (and/or other 
assumptions about responders' beliefs about proposers' preferences). However, given the one-
sided nature of the bargaining problem. these alternative assumption do not add enough to the 
analysis to justify the added complexity. 
':Here, the smallest offer possible is I e which translates into an offer of .I% in the percentage 
treatments (for a $10 pie). Since the proposer always knows the size of the pie. this translation is 
simple for him to do. There is some debate as to whether the responder will accept only strictly 
positive offers. or if an offer of 0 will be accepted. Sometimes an alternative subgame perfect 
equilibrium is described. whose payoffs are (1t, 0). Actual behavior departs so radically from 
anything considered small that we will not dwell here on the subtleties of either the translation or 
the zero-offer issues. 
'
3U(z. zJ(n-z));::: U(O.l ) where the first argument of the utility function is absolute payoffs 
(dollars) and the second is relative payoffs (the ratio of the responder's payoff to the proposer's). 
A rejection which results in an allocation of (0.0) has a relative (fairness) payoff defined as 1. 
'"If the random sampling hypothesis is correct and priors are identically distributed between the 
uninformed treatments. and if subjects do not update their beliefs about the size of the pie as a 
result of the offers they face. then Bolton· s equilibrium suggests that demands and offers should 
be identical in the two uninformed treatments as well. 
"There is nothing in these two hypotheses requiring that the thresholds be the same across 
responders. If they differ. the·e are two alternative assumptions we can make about proposers' 
knowledge of the threshold. In the first. the proposer knows exactly the threshold of the 
responder with whom he is matched. All offers should thus be calibrated to guarantee 
acceptance. In the second assumption. the proposer does not know the threshold of the 
responder with whom he is matched. although he may know the distribution of thresholds across 
responders. Proposers make their expected-utility-maximizing offer given the distribution. 
Under this assumption. some offers may be rejected. 
16An additional prediction which I do not test here is that offers should be for the smallest 
amount possible in each treatment. If some proposers have preferences for fairness and these 
proposers are randomly distributed in the four treatments. this latter prediction would be 
violated. but the prediction offered would be strengthened. 
17The Random/Divide treatment was the one-shot ultimatum game most similar to that run in this 
study. ~ 
'
8Also called the Mann-Whitney U test. this test is discussed in Siegel (1 956) pp. 116-126. 
'
90ffers in SI are greater than those in %1 (p<.IO). offers in %I are greater than those in SU 
(p<. IO) and offers in %U are greater than those in SU (p<.lO). Comparisons between %U and 
Sl and between %U and %I show no significant differences. 
211'he test used is based on a binomial distribution (calling an accepted offer a success and a 
rejected offer a failure). The test for comparing the means of two samples from a binomial 
distribution has a !-distribution. 
"The questionnaire was administered after responders had made their decisions but before they 
were paid. Thus in the SU and %U treatments. responders did not know the true size of the pie at 
the time they were answering the questions discussed. In the %U treatment they did not know 
their dollar earnings and in the $U treatment they did not know the percentage of the pie they had 
accepted or rejected. This procedure can be contrasted with other studies which used the strategy 
method in which subject 's answers to these sons of questions were their contingent responses in 
the game (Giith er al. (1982). Kahneman et al. (1986), Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993)). For an 
excellent discussion of the merits of the strategy method versus the decision method used in this 
study see Rapoport, Sundali and Seale (1993), pp. 31-32. 
"Some of the more interesting variations include: auctioning the roles of proposer and responder 
(Giith and Tietz (1986)); comparing subject pools by college major (Carter and Irons (1991)), by 
culture (Rother at. (1991)), and by sex (Eckel and Grossman (1992)); using comments as cues to 
behavior (Kravitz and Gunto (1992)); controlling proposer's beliefs about the responder's 
minimal acceptance levels (Hanison and McCabe (1992)); only using subjects who understand 
the subgame-perfect equilibrium (Ortona ( 1991 )) ; comparing the ultimatum game with the 
related dictator game (Forsythe er al. (1994)), with the best shot public goods provision game 
(Prasnikar and Roth (1992)); investigating how the assignment of roles of proposer and 
responder and the description of the problem affects the outcome (Hoffman er al. (1992)); 
examining ultimatum games when the players ' decisions are not known by the experimenter 
(Bolton and Zwick ( 1995)); and having subjects play ultimatum games in which they have to 




Offer made in 
percentage 
Table I: Treatments 
Responder's information 
about Pie Size 
informed uninformed 
$1 $U 
o/o l %U 
Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations and Sample Sizes of Observed Offers 
SI 
dollars 












( 1.67) ( 1.51) 
n=28 n=29 
Table 3: P-Values for Offer Differences Between Treatments 
su %U %1 
$1 .0045*" .1554 .0895 
su .0943 .0844 
%U .4682 
••significant at the I% level 













$1.68 ( 1.96) 
s 1.50 (!.58) 
$3.23 ( 1.37) 




•The mean and •tandard deviation omitting an outlier who believed the pie to be $50 are 7.46 (3.75) 
j (; 
I ,. 
Table 6: P-Values for Reported Demands between Treatments 
su %U %1 
$1 .0729 .0627 .0045** 
su .4564 .0000** 
%U 
.0001 ** 
**significant at the I% leve l 
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A. Instructions and quesuonnaires for SI 
B. Instructions and questionnaires for $U 
C. Instructions and questionnaires for %U 
D. Instructions and questionnaires for %1 
E. Composite instructions 
I ,. 
A. Instructions and questionnaires for $1 
PLAYERID 
You are player !. You and a randomly assigned player 2 have an opportunity to earn some money. 
There is a "pot" of money which the experimenter has set aside. You may offer some amount of 
the money (less than or equal to the amount in the pot) to player 2. If he accepts the offer, you get 
the pot minus the amount you offered, while player 2 receives the amount you offered. If he 
refuses the offer, you both get no money; the pot rerurns to the experimenter. Both you and player 
2 know the amount of money in the pot. 
To be sure you understand the procedure. fill in the blanks in the example below and wait for 
someone to check your answers . 
AN EXAMPLE: The pot is SX. You offer SY to player 2. (X~ Y) 
A: Player 2 accepts . Player 2 receives $ _ _ _ _ ,you receive$ ____ _ 
B: Player 2 refuses. Player 2 receives $ _ ___ , you receive$ ____ _ 
Any questions? 
The pot contains $10. You wi ll now offer some amount of the pot to player 2. Take as much or as 
little time as you like to decide. Once you have decided on your offer. write it in the appropriate 
place on the next page. We will communicate your offer to the appropriate player 2, who will 
respond on the same form. We will then pay you and player 2 any money which you have earned. 
At no time will player 2 know your identity, nor will you know his. 
1 ' 
,. 
OFFER AND RESPONSE FORM 
PLAYER ID ___ _ 
I, Player l, offer Player 2 $ ______ _ 
PLAYER ID ___ _ 
I, Player 2, accept I reject Player l's offer. (circle one) 
PLAYER ID - - - -
SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR PLAYERS I 
1. How did you decide what amount to offer? 
2. Before player 2 responded. what did you think was the lowest offer that he would have accepted? 
3. How d id you arrive at that number? 
4. After player 2 responded. what did you think was the lowest offer that he would have accepted? 
5. How did you arrive at that number' 
,. 
PLAYER ID 
You are player 2. You and a randomly assigned player I have an opportunity to earn some money. 
There is a "pot" of money which the experimenter has set aside. Player I will offer some amount 
of the pot to you. If you accept the offer. player I gets the pot minus the amount he offered to you, 
while you receive the amount offered to you. If you refuse the offer. you both get no money; the 
pot returns to the experimenter. Both you and player I know the amount of money in the pot. 
To be sure you understand the procedure. fill in the blanks in the example below and wait for 
someone to check your answers. 
AN EXAMPLE: The pot is $X. Player I offers SY to you. (X;:::: Y) 
A: You accept. You receive $ ____ ,player I receives$ _ ___ _ 
B: You refuse. You receive $ , player I receives$ ____ _ 
Any questions? 
The pot contains $10. Players I will now make their offers. Once that has occured, we will 
communicate to you the offer of the appropriate player I, and you will accept or refuse the offer. 
Take as much or as little time as you like to decide. We will then pay you and player I any money 
which you have earned. At no time will player I know your identity, nor will you know his. 
PLAYER ID ___ _ 
SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR PLAYERS 2 
I. What was the lowest offer from player I you would have accepted? 
2. How did you arrive at that number? 

' I• 
B. Instructions and questionnaires for $U 
PLAYERID 
You are player I. You and a randomly assigned player 2 have an opportunity to earn some money. 
There is a "pot" of money which the experimenter has set aside. You may offer some amount of 
the money (less than or equal tO the amount in the pot) to player 2 . If he accepts the offer, you get 
the pot minus the amount you offered, while player 2 receives the amount you offered. If he 
refuses the offer, you both get no money; the pot returns to the experimenter. Only you know the 
amount of money in the pot. that is. player 2 DOES NOT know the amount of money available to 
be d ivided. 
To be sure you understand the rrocedure, fill in the blanks in the example below and wait for 
someone to check your answers. 
AN EXAMPLE: The pot is SX. You offer SY to player 2. (X 2: Y} 
A: Player 2 accepts. Player 2 receives $ ____ ,you receive$ _ __ _ 
B: Player 2 refuses. Player 2 receives $ ____ ,you receive$ _____ . 
Any questions? 
The pot contains $10. You will now offer some amount of the pot to player 2. Take as much or as 
linle time as you like to decide. Once you have decided on your offer, write it in the appropriate 
place on the next page. We will communicate your offer to the appropriate player 2, who will 
respond on the same form . We will then pay you and player 2 any money which you have earned. 
'" At no timelwill player 2 know your identity, nor will you know his. REMEMBER THAT 
PLAYER 2 DOES NOT KNOW THE AMOUNT OF MONEY IN THE POT 
OFFER A..'ID RESPONSE FORM 
PLAYER ID ----
I, Player I, offer Player 2 $ _ _ _ ___ _ 
PLAYER ID - - --
I. Player 2. 
l ,, 
,. 
accept I reJecl Player l's offer. (circle one) 
PLAYER ID ----
SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR PLAYERS I 
l. How did you decide what amount to offer? 
2. Before player 2 responded. what did you think was the lowest offer that he would have accepted? 
3. How did you arrive at that number? 
4. After player 2 responded. what did you think was the lowest offer that he would have accepted? 
5. How did you arrive at that number? 
6. What dd' you think player 2 believed about the size of the pot? How big do you think he 
thought it was? How certain do you think he was about his guess? 
PLAYER ID 
You are player 2. You and a randomly assigned player I have an opportunity to eam some money. 
There is a "pot" of money which the experimenter has set aside. Player l will offer some amount 
of the pot to you. If you accept the offer. player I gets the pot minus the amount he offered to you, 
while you receive the amount offered to you. If you refuse the offer, you both get no money; the 
pot returns to the experimenter. Only player l knows the amount of money in the pot, in 
particular, you DO NOT know the amount of money available to be divided. 
To be sure you understand the procedure. fill in the blanks in the example below and wait for 
someone to check your answers. 
AN EXAMPLE: You do not know the amount in the pot. Player I offers $Y to you. 
A: You accept. You receive $ _ ___ ,player 1 receives$. ____ _ 
B: You refuse. You receive S ____ , player 1 receives$ _ ___ _ 
Any questions? 
You do not know the amount of money in the pot. Players I will now make their offers. Once that 
has occured, we will communicate to you the offer of the appropriate player I, and you will accept or 
refuse the offer. Take as much or as little time as you like to decide. We will then pay you and 
player I any money which you have earned. At no time will player I know your identity, nor will 
you know his. 
1 \.' 
, .. 
PLAYER ID ___ _ 
SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR PLAYERS 2 
I . Before you saw Player I 's offer. what was your best estimate of the size of the pot? 
How certain were you of this estimate? 
2. What was the lowest offer from player I you would have accepted? 
3. How did you arrive at that number? 
4. After you saw player I 's offer. what was your best estimate of the size of the pot? 
How certain were you of this estimate? 
5. Did the: Cowest offer you would accept change as a result of player 1 's offer? 
In what way and why? 
l \J 
~ .. 
C. Instructions and questionnaires for % U 
PLAYER lD 
You are player I. You and a randomly assigned player 2 have an opportunity to earn some money. 
There is a "pot" of money whtch the experimenter has set aside. You may offer some percentage 
of the money (from 0% to I 00%) to player 2. If he accepts the offer, you get the pot minus what 
you offered, while player 2 receives what you offered. If he refuses the offer, you both get no 
money: the pot returns to the experimenter. Only you know the amount of money in the pot, that 
is. player 2 DOES NOT know the amount of money available to be divided. 
To be sure you understand the procedure. fill in the blanks in the example below and wait for 
someone tO check your answers. 
AN EXAMPLE: The pot b $X. You offer Y% to player 2. 
A: Player 2 accepts. Player 2 receives $ ___ ~ you receive $. ____ _ 
B: Player 2 refuses. Player 2 receives S , you receiveS ___ _ 
Any questions? 
The pot contains $10. You wi ll now offer some percentage of the pot to player 2. Take as much or 
as little time as you like to decide. Once you have decided on your offer. write It in the appropriate 
place on the next page. We will communicate your offer to the appropriate player 2, who will 
respond on the same form. We will then pay you and player 2 any money which you have earned. 
At no time will player 2 know your identity, nor will you know his. REMEMBER THAT 
PLAYER 2 DOES NOT KNOW THE AMOUNT OF MONEY IN THE POT. 
OFFER A.'\'D RESPONSE FORM 
PLAYER ID _ __ _ 
I, Player I. offer Player 2 
PLAYER ID 
I. Player 2. 
... 
,. 
_ _ _____ %of the pot. 
accept I reJeCt Player I 's offer. (circle one) 
PLAYER ID _ _ _ _ 
SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR PLAYERS 1 
1. How did you decide what percentage to offer? 
2. Before player 2 responded. what did you think was the lowest offer that he would have accepted? 
3. How did you arrive at that number'1 
4. After player 2 responded. what did you thtnk was the lowest offer that he would have accepted? 
5. How did you arrive at that number? 
6. What ~,YOU think player 2 believed about the size of the pot? How big do you think he 
th6ught it was? How cenain do you think he was about his guess? 
PLAYER ID 
You are player 2. You and a randomly assigned player I have an opportunity to earn some money. 
There is a "pot" of money which the experimenter has set aside. Player I will offer some percentage 
of the pot to you (from 0% to 100%). If you accept the offer, player I gets the pot minus what he 
offered to you, while you receive what he offered to you. If you refuse the offer, you both get no 
money; the pot returns to the experimenter. Only player I knows the amount of money in the pot, in 
particular, you DO NOT know the amount of money available to be divided. 
To be sure you understand the procedure. fill in the blanks in the example below and wa1t for 
someone to check your answers. 
Al~ EXAMPLE: You do not know the amount in the pot. Player I offers Y% to you. 
A: You accept. You receive S ____ , player I receives S _ _ _ _ 
B: You refuse. You receive S ____ , player I receives S ____ _ 
Any questions? 
You do not know the amount of money in the pot. Players I will now make their offers. Once that 
has occured, we will communicate to you the offer of the appropriate player I. and you will accept or 
refuse the offer. Take as much or as little time as you like to decide. We will then pay you and player 





SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR PLAYERS 2 
I. Before you saw Player J's offer. what was your best estimate of the size of the pot? 
How certain were you of this estimate? 
2. What was the lowest offer from player I you would have accepted? 
3. How d id you arrive at that number? 
4. After you saw player I 's offer. what was your best estimate of the size of the pot? 
How certain were you of this estimate? 
5. Did the lowest offer you would accept change as a result of player I 's offer? 
In what way and why? 
,. 
I •• 
D. Instructions and questionnaires for %1 
PLAYER ID 
You are player I. You and a randomly assigned player 2 have an opportunity to earn some money. 
There is a "pot" of money which the experimenter has set aside. You may offer some percentage 
of the money (from 0% to I 00%) to player 2. If he accepts the offer, you get the pot minus what 
you offered, while player 2 receives what you offered. If he refuses the offer, you both get no 
money; the pot returns to the experimenter. Both you and player 2 know the amount of money in 
the pot. 
To be sure you understand the procedure, fill in the blanks in the example below and wait for 
someone to check your answe: ·~ 
AN EXAMPLE: The pot is $X. You offer Y% to player 2. 
A: Player 2 accepts . Player 2 receives $ ____ ,you receive$ ____ _ 
B: Player 2 refuses. Player 2 receives $ ____ ,you receive$. ____ _ 
Any questions? 
The pot contains $10. You will now offer some percentage of the pot to player 2. Take as much or 
as little time as you like to decide. Once you have decided on your offer, write it in the appropriate 
place on the next page. We will communicate your offer to the appropriate player 2, who will 
respond on the same form. We will then pay you and player 2 any money which you have earned. 
At no time will player 2 know your identity, nor will you know his. 
, .,. 
·1 Jt 
OFFER AND RESPONSE FORM 
PLAYER ID ----
I, Player I, offer Player 2 ______ _ %of the pot. 
PLAYER ID ___ _ 
I, Player 2, 
't (' 
t ,, 
accept I reject Player l's offer. (circle one) 
PLAYER ID ___ _ 
SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR PLAYERS I 
I. How did you decide what percentage to offer? 
2. Before player 2 responded. what did you think was the lowest offer that he would have accepted? 
3. How did you arrive at that number? 
4. After player 2 responded. what d1d you think was the lowest offer that he would have accepted? 
5. How did you arrive at that number? 
'0 
,. 
E. Composite instructions 
PLAYER ID ----
You are player 1 or 2. You and a randomly assigned player of the opposite number have an opportunity 
to earn some money. 
There is a "pot" of money which the experimenter has set aside. Player l will offer some amount 
of the pot to player 2. If player 2 accepts the offer, player 1 gets the pot minus the amount he 
offered, while player 2 receives the amount offered. If player 2 refuses the offer, both players get 
no money; the pot returns to the experimenter. (if known treatment) Both players 1 and 2 know 
the amount of money in the pot. (if unknown treatment) Only player I knows the amount of 
money in the pot, in particular. player 2 does not know the amount of money available to be 
divided. 
To be sure you understand the procedure. fill in the blanks in the example below and wait for 
someone to check your answers. 
AN EXAMPLE: (if known treatment) The pot is $X. Player 1 offers $Y (if percentage 
treatment Y%) to player 2. (if unknown treatment) On player l 's instruction sheets it says the 
amount of money in the pot for this example only. On player 2's instruction sheet it will remind 
you that you do not know the amount of money in the pot. Player I offers SY (if percentage 
treatment Yo/o) to player 2. 
A: Player 2 accepts. Player 2 receives $. ____ , player I receives$. _ _ _ _ 
B: Player 2 refuses. Player 2 receives $ , player I receives$ _ _ _ _ 
Any questions? 
(if known treatment) There isS 10 in the !>Ot. (if unknown rrearmenc) At this point, players 1 
mstructions include the amount of money in the pot and players 2 are reminded that they do not 
know the amount of money in the pot. Players I will now make their offers. Once that has 
occurred, we will communicate to player 2 the offer of the appropriate player l , and that player 2 will 
accept or refuse the offer. Take as much or as little time as you like to decide. We will then pay 
both playe,r} and player I any money which you have earned. At no time will player I know player 
2' s identirS';" nor will player 2 know player I's. ( if unknown treatment) Rernemberthat player 2 
does not know the amount of money in the pot available to be divided. 
PLAYERID 
You are player 2. You and a randomly assigned player I have an opportunity to earn some money. 
There is a "pot" of money which the experimenter has set aside. Player I will offer some 
percentage ofthe pot to you (from 0% to 100%). If you accept the offer, player I gets the pot 
minus what he offered to you, while you receive what he offered to you. If you refuse the offer, 
you both get no money; the pot returns to the experimenter. Both you and player I know the 
amount of money in the pot. 
To be sure you understand the procedure. fill in the blanks in the example below and wait for 
someone to check your answers. 
AN EXAMPLE: The pot is SX. Player I offers Y% to you. 
A: You accept. You receive S ____ , player I receives$ ____ _ 
B: You refuse. You receive S ____ , player I receives$. ____ _ 
Any questions? 
The pot contains S 10. Players I will now make their offers. Once that has occured, we will 
communicate to you the offer of the appropriate player I, and you will accept or refuse the offer. 
Take as much or as little time as you like to decide. We will then pay you and player I any money 




SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR PLAYERS 2 
I. What was the lowest offer from player I you would have accepted? 
2. How did you arrive at that number? 
,. 
H• 
